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SMITH, LYONS ESSAY
Problems with the International Definition
of a Refugee and a Possible Solution
Toby D.J. Mendel*
The discourse of altruism that characterizes most discussions ofrefugee law as currently established is therefore simply misplaced. To reflect a commitment to
attaining a humane and dignified response to the needs
of involuntary migrants, the time is clearly right to
engage in a fundamental reassessment of strategy.
Par consequent, le discours altruistique qui characterize
la plupart des discussions du droit des refugies tel que
nous le conaissons aujourd'hui est tout simplement
deplace. Si nous voulons proner un engagement.envers
l'etablissement d'une reponse, taut humanitaire
qu'empreinte de dignite aux besoins de ces emigres
involontaires, le temps est a une reevaluation en
profondeur de notre strategie.
Wla wesku'taqn wjit ktlamite'taqn tan telamkwa'toqleikl
mawaknutmakn', wjit wesimkultitewk tepultaqnmwow,
tan nike kisutasik, Lpajel opli ika'tasik. We'kayiw kisi
tli ankamkuk nkutey elapukwemkel elnuey aqq kepmek
teli maliaptasik tan teli nutatij wesimkultitewk, nike
mawi nutak amskwesewey nekaqn wjit tan
tla'taqititen. **
J.C. Hathaway
"A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise
of Refugee Law"
(1990) 31 Harvard Int'l L. J. 129 at 181.
INTRODUCTION
The plight of refugees is one of the most urgent and complex
problems confronting the international community. The estimated
number of refugees in the world today varies significantly depending,
among other things, on how one defines a refugee and the exact date of
the count. All agree, however, that refugees number in the millions and
most estimates range between ten and fifteen million. I
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International legal protection for refugees is primarily codified
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status ofRefugees2 and the 1967
Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 3 To engage the protection of the
international community today requires a potential refugee to fit within
the definition found in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention:
[Someone who,] ... owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country ofhis
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.4
This definition has attracted widespread municipal support5 and many
countries have incorporated this definition directly into local statutory
regimes dealing with refugees. 6
A significant problem with this
definition, however, is that more than one-half of the world's de facto
refugees (those who are, for reasons other than personal convenience,
outside of their country ofnormal residence) do not fall within its ambit. 7
In addition, there is no binding obligation on states to grant asylum to
those who are covered.
In addition to the definition of a refugee, there is the principle of
nonrefoulement, codified in Article 33 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
No Contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account ofhis race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.8
This applies only to those who are already within a contracting state and
not to those seeking refuge from abroad.
In the first part of this study I review the history of the
Convention and the Protocol as it is relevant to the shortcomings of these
two documents. I then discuss more fully the problems, summarized
above, associated with the Convention definition of refugee. Finally, I
will canvass some possible practical solutions to the international
refugee situation.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The international community's concern with refugees, as we use
that term today, began after the First World War. In 1921, the Office of
the High Commissioner for Refugees, the first institution to deal with
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refugees, was created by the League ofNations. 9 This was conceived of
as a temporary office to deal with the exodus ofRussians from the Soviet
Union. In 1928 a similar arrangement was concluded to cover Assyrian
and Turkish nationals fleeing their respective states.10 This was
followed by a series of agreements providing protection for a host of other
specific groups of refugees.11
The League of Nations did not attempt to define a refugee in
general terms but chose to deal with each crisis as it came along. The
refugees covered by these agreements had the following general characteristics:
( 1) they [were] nationals of a particular territory; (2)
they [had] lost the protection, in law or in fact, of the
particular government controlling the said territory;
and (3)
[were] stateless or possessed no other
nationality. 2
The main focus was not on the racial, ethnic, political or religious
characteristics of the refugees, but on the loss of protection of a national
state. For example, the agreement covering the Russian exiles noted
that they "no longer enjoyed the protection of the Government of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and had not acquired another
nationality."13
The first general principle of international law concerning refugees appears in Subarticle 14(1) of the Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights:
14(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.14
The Second World War generated tremendous refugee problems which
made it necessary to promulgate a more comprehensive scheme for
dealing with refugees and to create a regime to administer it. In 1950 the
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees was passed by a United Nations General Assembly resolution,
establishing a body to deal with refugees.15
The Convention defined refugees in two ways:16 it included
those already considered refugees by the various agreements and conventions dealing with stateless persons, 17 and it added a general
definition of a refugee.18 The definition, however, was restricted in its
application to those displaced by events occurring before January 1,
1951. In addition, exposing the European focus of the Convention,
Subarticle l(B)(l) allowed states to restrict the ambit of the definition to
events occurring in Europe.19 The Convention improved on previous
instruments by applying generally, to all nationalities, and by substituting persecution for lack of national protection as the main criterion for
granting refugee status. It retained, however, the temporal and geographical limitations of the previous agreements.
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By 1967 it was clear that events occurring outside of Europe or
since 1951 continued to generate refugees who were in need of protection
but who were not covered by the Convention. It was equally clear that
these refugees had as much right to asylum as those already covered by
the Convention. Accordingly, a Protocol was passed by the United
Nations General Assembly. Article I, Sections 1 and 2, remove the
temporal and geographical limitations, in the Convention definition of a
refugee. Article I, Section 3, however, preserves the declarations of
limitation made under Subarticle l(B)(l)(a) of the Convention.20 As
Fragomen points out, any state which acceded to the Convention before
the Protocol could elect to restrict the application ofboth the Convention
and the Protocol to events in Europe, thereby
the main
purpose of the Protocol while reaping the political benefits. 1
PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE
The definition of a refugee found in the Convention is problematic mainly because it excludes a large number of de facto refugees.22
The tension between the moral imperative to help those who are no
longer being adequately looked after by their state of normal residence
and the demands of state sovereignty has affected both the formulation
and the application of the definition.23 It would appear, however, that
moral imperatives have had less influence. Hathaway argues that
neither humanitarian nor human rights principles were important in
formulating the Convention definition of a refugee .. 24 On the other hand,
several factors have contributed to the disproportionate influence of
state sovereignty on the development of the definition. For example, a
mass influx of refugees into a country compromises the independence of
that country and in some cases subverts national goals.25 Due to the
United Nations General Assembly's recognition of the high status of
state sovereignty, the drafters were well aware that if they worded the
definition too strongly it would fail to attract sufficient support from the
international community. Lack of good faith on the part of states jealous
to safeguard their sovereignty compounds the problems inherent in a
weak definition.
Unlike the earlier attempts to deal with refugee crises which
were concentrated in Europe, modern refugee problems often involve
people from diverse cultural backgrounds. The prospective receiving
state feels little affinity to these people and, hence, its commitment to
helping them is weak.26 The perception that some states manipulate
mass exoduses to achieve political ends in an international ideological
battle, further erodes support for effective refugee relief.27
Other problems flow from the fact that the definition was
essentially designed to deal with the situation in Europe after World
War II. The circumstances generating refugees today are profoundly
different. The persecutors of today are not conquered submissive
governments but independent sovereign nations. 28 Motivations for both
persecution and fleeing have changed29 and technological changes have
also had their impact on the global refugee crisis. Technological
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contributions include the enhanced capability of states to persecute, the
proliferation of air travel allowing people to move rapidly and safely
around the globe, and the massive increase in the flow of information
generating a greater impetus to leave.
The Definition of a "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted"
Problems associated with the definition of a well-founded fear of
persecution fall into two categories: those relating to the standard of
proofrequired and those relating to the definition of'persecution'. Most
countries accept that proof of a well-founded fear of persecution involves
both an objective and a subjective component. There is, however,
considerable disagreement over what the standard of proof should be,
who should bear the onus of proof, and what evidential strictures should
be applied. It is crucial to those seeking asylum to know the answers to
these questions in advance. For the definition to be effective internationally it is imperative that the standard of proof be uniform among
receiving states.
The requisite standard ofproofhas attracted considerable attention in the United States. The United States Supreme Court decided
that different standards should apply to granting asylum and withholding deportation. 30 The court held that withholding of deportation,
which gives rise to an absolute right not to be deported, requires proof on
the balance of probabilities, while eligibility for asylum, which only
grants discretionary admittance, requires something less. The United
States is alone among the Western countries31 in that it has created
different standards of proof for nonrefoulement and asylum.
The requirement adopted by most Western countries that both
objective and subjective components must be proved in order to establish
a well-founded fear of persecution works injustice on those who have, in
the heat of the moment, overreacted to what they perceive as persecution. 32 It is unreasonable to expect those who fear for their physical
integrity to weigh with nicety the probability of danger. In addition,
prospective refugees often have limited information and insufficient
time to come to a reasoned decision on their chances of being abused.
It is widely recognized that the lack of a definition of persecution
in the Convention definition of a refugee causes serious problems. 33 At
the moment, there are great discrepancies between the definitions
applied in different countries;34 definitions range from very liberal to
fairly restrictive. The liberal view encompasses several viewpoints:
those who argue that an affront to human dignity constitutes persecution,35 those who view violations of human rights as a useful criterion
for defining persecution, 36 and those who think that deprivation oflife
or liberty for more than a n1ligible period of time would best demarcate
the limits of persecution. 3 The restrictive view equates persecution
with loss oflife or serious deprivation of physical freedom. 38 Hathaway
criticizes the definition for being flexible enough to allow states to
manipulate it to accord with their national interests, thereby depriving
the Convention definition of a refugee of much ofits effect. 39 A definition
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intended to be used for legal purposes requires clarity and the Convention definition fails to satisfy this basic requirement.
V. P. Nanda suggests that, in practice, the definition of persecution generally adopted is restrictive and applies only to individuals who
"face discrimination or maltreatment ... of a very serious kind."40 This
suggestion is supported by case law from various countries. Indeed, even
in Canada, a country traditionally regarded as liberal in formulating
refugee policy,41 the interpretation of the definition seems to result in
the exclusion of many de facto refugees. In Re lyar42 the applicant was
an Indian living in South Africa. Although she was segregated and not
allowed to vote, the Immigration Appeal Board held that since she failed
to identify any incident in which she had been physically persecuted, she
was the subject of discrimination and not persecution. R. Plender
identifies a British case where the Immigration Appeals Tribunal held
that prosecution for breach of a country's laws could not amount to
persecution.43 If this is correct, then millions of Jews deprived of their
property and put into camps in Nazi Germany, under the laws of that
country, would have been ineligible for relief.

Cognizable Grounds of Persecution
To qualify as a refugee under the Convention definition, establishing persecution is not sufficient. The persecution must also be based
on one of the enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. This is an illogical
additional burden for someone who has been persecuted. If the essence
ofrefugee status lies in the loss of protection of the state ofresidence due
to persecution, the basis of that persecution should be irrelevant. D. P.
Gagliardi argues convincingly that the grounds of persecution should
not be confused with the fact of persecution itselfand, therefore, should
not be incorporated into the definition of persecution:
The cognizable grounds simply describe the tormentor's
motive; but it is the intent to do harm, not the motive,
that defines persecution. In short, the cognizable grounds
focus attention on the wrong question ... Their inclusion
invites inquiry into factors that are tangential to the
notion of persecution itself and to the humanitarian
purpose of providing relief to victims of persecution. 44
In addition, the definition does not make it clear whether persecution
based on the fact of membership in one of the cognizable grounds is
enough or whether persecution for acts taken pursuant to membership
is required.45
There are two main ways in which people who are persecuted can
fail to fit within the cognizable grounds: first, the categories simply do
not cover all the grounds upon which people are commonly persecuted,
and second, since a substantial amount of persecution does not have a
clear motivation but relates to general conditions of violence and repres-
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sion, activity which amounts to persecution may nevertheless fall
outside the definition.
Race, religion, and nationality, while subject to different interpretations, are reasonably well defined terms. The political opinion
category, however, is subject to widely varying interpretation, largely
based on one's ideological perspective. The United States, for example,
regularly defined those who had fled from communist countries for
political reasons as refugees, while declining to do so for those who had
fled from countries friendly to the United States.46 Political exiles, an
important group ofrefugees, are often at the mercy of the international
political scene and factors irrelevant to their persecution may determine
their international status.
Hyndman points out that it may be difficult to establish a link
between a political opinion and the repressive measures taken by the
state, thus precluding protection despite clearly established persecution. 47 Western countries have generally accepted that the test as to
whether something qualifies as political activity should be based on the
classification of that activity by the ruling government of the country
from which the refugee fled.48 This is often problematic, however, since
states generally do not link sanctions explicitly to the political activity
that inspired them. In some countries the repressive organs that carry
out persecution have developed sophisticated techniques to mask their
motivation, particularly when the object is political repression.
Membership in the 'particular social group' category is also
subject to varying interpretation, often based on ideology, international
relations or fear of a massive influx ofrefugees. In a case from the United
States, Acosta,49 the applicant belonged to a taxi co-operative in El
Salvador which refused to join in a work stoppage at the request of the
anti-government guerillas. Subsequently, several of the members were
killed and Acosta himself received death threats. Although the Immigration Appeal Board accepted Acosta's testimony and held there was a
well-founded fear of persecution, it denied him relief, holding that the
taxi co-operative did not qualify as a social group. In a Canadian case,
Severe, 50 the applicant was a member of a socialist theatrical group in
Haiti which was critical of the government and whose leaders had been
harassed constantly by the Tonton Macoute Militiamen. The Board
classified the group as analogous to a 'literary circle', not a 'social group',
and rejected the claim.51 In another Canadian case, Belfond,52 the
Board further limited the term 'social group':
Either the group must be political and proclaim and
exhibit dissidence with the regime or be a religious sect
which has been persecuted by the civil authorities because of its religious beliefs. In a multinational state, a
racial minority might constitute such a group. 53
Such a restrictive interpretation of 'social group' essentially voids the
category of meaning.
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Often, a government under attack from guerillas, in what
amounts to a civil war, will either randomly persecute in areas where it
suspects the populace generally of supporting the guerillas, or retaliate
in an over-inclusive way because of inability to effectively identify
destabilizing elements.54 Many of those affected may be apolitical or
even supportive of the government; in such a cases the persecution
cannot properly be said to be based on political opinion. The real cause
is the government's paranoia or the techniques they have adopted to deal
with insurgency. The definition is simply not designed to cover such
situations. In Coriolan v. I.N.S. 55 the court quoted from an Amnesty
International report on conditions in Haiti under the Duvalier regime:
There may have been no political activity whatsoever, as
a large number are imprisoned indiscriminately ... We
cannot believe, however, that Congress would have
refused sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to
be the victims of a government which did not require
political activity or opinion to trigger its oppression. 56
The need for the international community to provide protection from
random government persecution is as acute as it is when the persecution
is based on one of the cognizable grounds.
As Gagliardi points out, random or over-inclusive persecution is
to be distinguished from destabilization directly associated with civil
war or invasion by foreign forces.57 In a civil war or during a foreign
invasion certain measures, such as curfews, military censorship and
restrained searches, may be enforced as part of a military response.
Measures not related to military objectives but designed primarily to
terrorize the population should be classified as persecution. In any
particular situation it may be difficult to draw a clear line between
actions with a valid military objective and those essentially designed to
persecute.

The Requirement to be Outside Your Country of Nationality
Another requirement of the Convention definition is that a
refugee claimant be outside his or her country of nationality. This is a
requirement that those being persecuted must satisfy to gain the
protection of the international community, but which is essentially
unrelated to their need for protection.58 The problem is not insignificant, as Fragomen points out; such people may constitute a majority of
those refugees excluded by the Convention definition of a refugee. 59 The
High Commissioner for Refugees has also complained of this problem:
[I]t is felt by some that persons who do not cross an
internationally recognized border should be treated as
displaced persons. Here again, there is need for clarification.60
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It is clearly inconsistent with the aim ofrefugee law to exclude potential
refugees merely because they have failed to leave their country of
residence. Often failure to leave is a direct result of the persecution they
are suffering from in the first place.
This requirement also raises questions about the underlying
premise of modern refugee assistance. Many of those applying for
refugee status do so because they are involved with secessionist movements contesting the borders of their countries. This is especially true
in post-colonial countries where the borders rarely conform to ethnic
divisions. To deny refugee status merely because the claimant is unable
to escape the contested borders is to deny responsibility for a problem
often created by Western colonial powers in the first place. Groups
fighting for independence should represent the quintessential aim of
modern refugee law; providing an escape for political activists is an
indirect way of supporting such movements. To require those involved
in secessionist movements to leave undermines this support both by
reinforcing, at an international level, the validity of the contested state
borders and by posing additional obstacles in the way ofrefugee protection.

Exclusions
Article 1, Sections C to F, of the Convention contain a number of
exceptions to the granting ofrefugee status under the Section A definition. Sections C and E refer to people who, for one reason or another,
come within the protection of an acceptable state. Section D disqualifies
those receiving aid from organs or agencies of the United Nations other
than the UNHCR. This considerably lessens the scope of the definition. 61 Subsection F(b) excludes those who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes. In these cases, the underlying rationale for refugee
protection is ignored. 'Criminals' may not be highly desirable as new
citizens but they are surely no less deserving of protection from an
oppressive state than anyone else. Finally, Subsection F(c) excludes
those who have "been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."62 The scope of the "purposes and
principles" of the United Nations is undefined. Even ifit were restricted
to the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter (the most
restrictive practical interpretation possible), the ambit of this phrase is
very wide and could easily be abused. These exclusions derogate from
the principle behind providing refugee protection and should be curtailed accordingly.

The Discretionary Nature of Granting Asylum
Neither the Convention nor the Protocol place any obligation on
signatories to grant asylum to those coming within the definition of a
refugee; individual states retain absolute discretion to admit or reject
refugees. 63 Subarticle 33( 1) of the Convention prohibits expulsion of
refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened
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but this only applies to persons already within the Contracting State's
borders. The discretionary nature of the grant of asylum is a fundamental weakness in the scheme of protection afforded refugees. 64 During
the Cold War, the West made use of refugees as a propaganda weapon
in its international ideological battles. As a result, accepting refugees
has come to be seen as a negative comment upon the internal affairs of
the state of origin. Many states are thus reluctant to grant refugee status
to those fleeing friendly regimes and use their discretion to avoid
political embarrassment at the expense of the claimants.65 Even more
alarming is the possibility that governments will use their discretion to
warp the aim of refugee law not only to avoid offending friendly states
but also to enhance their municipal standing. The effects of this may
range from only 'importing' educated refugees to introducing a colour
bias when accepting refugees because of domestic racism.66
No procedure for determining or admitting refugees is prescribed by the Convention. Thus, states often design their procedures in
a way that allows them to adapt international obligations to their own
needs. 67 Such procedures often vary widely. 68 Many countries have
simply elected not to set up any procedures at all. 69 This glaring lacunae
in the Convention enables Contracting States to exclude any unwanted
refugees without acknowledging the real reasons for doing so; thereby
avoiding international scrutiny.

The Need For Individual Assessment
The Convention requires an individual determination ofrefugee
status. Mass exoduses of people from a state now generate a large
proportion of all refugees and these
pose the greatest challenges to international refugee law. 7
The assessment procedure
required to determine refugees under the Convention presents a major
barrier to efficient processing in the case of a mass migration.71 The
Convention and Protocol, designed to deal with manageable numbers of
refugees, are difficult to comply with when huge numbers are involved.
States initially receiving large refugee flows, generally less
developed countries with few resources, are often completely unable to
deal with entrants on an individual basis. Even in states of final refuge,
despite their generally superior resources, there is a tendency for
determination systems to generate backlogs. 72 The Convention definition places the additional burden of individual determination on states
already reluctant to admit large numbers of refugees. Difficulties in
applying the Convention definition tends to dilute its acceptance, support, and uniform application in the international refugee determination process.

Displaced Persons
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Convention refugee definition is that it fails to provide any relief for persons dislocated by war, civil
strife, natural disasters, or serious economic disruptions. 73 The precise
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problems of displaced persons, referred to by the UNHCR as de facto
refugees, may differ from the problems of persons who are actively being
persecuted by their governments, but their need for assistance, especially immediate aid, is no less imperative. 74 Furthermore, the main
cause of forced migration is not persecution but a combination of natural
disaster, war and economic turmoil. 75 It is contrary to the basic notion
of a refugee, as reflected in common parlance, to exclude those fleeing
from causes other than persecution from international protection under
the Convention.
The history of refugee law, starting with the League of Nations,76 is basically a response to the problem of persons displaced by
diverse factors including war and civil strife. It is inconsistent with this
history to limit refugee status to those suffering from persecution. As
Fragomen points out, the distinction between political and economic
refugees is frequently artificial. 77 Most political and racial oppression
is based on a struggle for economic control. To try and divorce politics
and economics is, at a practical level, verging on the ridiculous. The real
point, however, is that those deprived of basic human needs require
international protection whether that deprivation is based on direct
government oppression or factors tangential to it. To deprive displaced
persons from relief under international refugee law is both inhumane
and incompatible with the overall aims ofrefugee law.
SOLUTIONS
Having established that there are problems with the international definition of a refugee, it is now necessary to propose solutions.
There are really only three viable alternatives in the treatment of
refugees: voluntary repatriation; temporary absorption into the country
of first refuge; or final resettlement in a third country.78 The first
generally requires a change in the circumstances that brought about
flight in the first place. Chamberlain suggests that the root causes
should be studied to improve the international community's response to
the problem through careful development aid. 79 While this is certainly
a useful suggestion, development aid is unlikely to remove all sources of
refugees, especially in the short run. 80
The second and third possibilities require an expansion of the
Convention definition of a refugee. J. I. Gunning has suggested that
resistance to widening the definition is based on two arguments: concern
about the availability of resources and fear that state sovereignty in the
area of foreign policy would be compromised. 81 To these considerations
I would add the desire to deter an influx of culturally, racially and
politically dissimilar people, both for political reasons and general
xenophobia.

Moves Towards Expanding the Definition of a Refugee
The first efforts to expand the definition of a refugee came,
predictably, from the UNHCR. By 1957, the General Assembly had
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authorized the UNHCR to use its 'good offices' to aid refugees who fell
outside their direct mandate.82 In 1965 the General Assembly eliminated the distinction between Convention and non-Convention refugees
with respect to the UNHCR seeking intetnational assistance for refugees. 83 Finally, in 1975, the General Assembly authorized the UNHCR
to act for victims of man-made events who were in a situation 'analogous'
to that of Convention refugees.84
In 1969, the Organization of African Unity adopted a convention
to deal with the problem ofrefugees regionally. In addition to covering
Convention refugees Article 1, Subsection (2) extends the traditional
coverage:
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who,
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in
either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside
his country of origin or nationality. 85
This coverage is similar in its ambit to the 1975 extension of the powers
of the UNHCR discussed above.
In 1984, a colloquium on international protection for refugees in
Central America, Mexico and Panama was held in the Republic of
Columbia. The Conclusions and Recommendations (known as the
"Cartegena Declaration on Refugees") calls for the definition of refugee
to include:
[P]ersons who have fled their country because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.86
This definition extends coverage in approximately the same way as the
OAU Convention and the 1975 amendment to the UNHCR's powers.

The Problems of Resources and Foreign Policy
The fear ofrefugee-receiving countries that resources would be
strained by an expansion of the definition of a refugee is probably
unfounded. The UNHCR already provides assistance to de facto refugees, so to that extent, no additional resources would be required. More
importantly, the decision to leave one's country of origin is determined
primarily by practical considerations, not those set out in the Convention
definition of a refugee. Further, factors such as cost and the personal
destabilization likely to ensue prevent the vast majority of those entertaining thoughts of leaving their homelands from translating their
thoughts into action. In any case, one must balance the moral imperative
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of aiding those who need international protection with the issue of a lack
of resources. The massive charitable efforts launched each time a new
crisis occurs suggest that the means to provide assistance are available.
Presently, production ofrefugees is often viewed by the international community as a negative comment on the internal affairs of the
state of origin. Governments are concerned that an expansion of the
definition of a refugee will limit state discretion to control admission and
inhibit their ability to freely determine foreign policy. A significant
broadening of the scope of the definition of a refugee, however, would
tend to reduce the ideological content now attached to refugee acceptance. By shifting the focus from persecution ofindividuals, which is seen
as unacceptable, to inability to protect groups, the determination of a
refugee would be based on economic, as opposed to moral, considerations. The negative foreign policy implications of accepting refugees
from friendly states would be largely neutralized by the lessened stigma
of refugee production.

The Problem of Displaced Persons
Many of the defects in the Convention definition, discussed
above, affect only a small number ofrefugees in particular circumstances
and could be solved by minor adjustments, without significantly altering
the scope or the object of the definition. The problem of displaced persons,
whether uprooted by war, civil unrest, serious economic disruption or
natural disaster, differs in nature from other weaknesses in the definition in two main respects: first, displaced persons are suffering from a
qualitatively different problem than persecuted persons and, second, the
number of displaced persons is extremely large, hence inclusion in the
definition would require major changes to the operation of any scheme
designed to deal with refugees.
It is widely recognized that displaced persons suffer in a qualitatively different way than those who are actively persecuted by their
governments.87 Perhaps the best way to describe this difference is that
the former require the assistance of the international community while
the latter require its protection. I propose that the problem of displaced
persons be dealt with primarily by granting refuge on a temporary basis
with a view to voluntary repatriation after the conditions giving rise to
the need for refuge have dissipated. Temporary refuge should be
organized on a regional basis. This·organization would accord with
present realities, be acceptable to the international community at large,
minimize disruption to the individuals involved, and reduce costs. To
prevent the burden of granting temporary refuge from falling predominantly on those states accommodating refugee influxes, those who can
generally least afford it, the financial obligations incurred should be
distributed according to ability to pay, primarily among the developed
nations.88
The idea of temporary refuge has been gaining support in the
international community, partly because it is practical.89 The OAU
Convention only extends asylum rights to Convention refugees while
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displaced persons merely have the right not to be deported
(nonrefoulement).90 While the principle ofnonrefoulement in Article 33
of the Convention only extends to refugees, it represents the only
obligation incurred by State Parties that is beyond their control. Presumably, individuals entitled to nonrefoulement, but not granted permanent residence, would obtain temporary refuge. Hyndman suggests that
temporary refuge accords both with state practice and is found in many
international instruments.91 Hartman has argued convincingly that
temporary refuge has become a norm of international customary law, at
least in relation to civilians fleeing internal armed conflict.92
An advantage of temporary refuge is that it envisages eventual
voluntary repatriation of the displaced persons once conditions return to
normal in the state of origin. There are several advantages to this
relative to the other durable solutions, permanent asylum or resettlement: the individuals involved are not subjected to cultural and political
disruptions and other traumas attendant upon relocation in a foreign
environment, costs are minimized, and foreign policy implications are
reduced.93
The key to the success or failure of any system proposed for the
international arena is its acceptability to the actors involved. 94 The
system being proposed would impose obligations on two sets of states:
those providing temporary refuge, and those who are being asked to
sustain the financial burden. Those providing temporary refuge will be
amenable to this system in part because they are culturally and ethnically similar to the refugees and have a better understanding of their
plight. The same forces that gave rise to the initial international refugee
protection in Europe generate sympathy and tolerance with respect to
refugees from within relatively homogeneous regions.95 These states
have great difficulty controlling the flow ofrefugees in any case and tend
to absorb them under the current system despite the lack of any
obligation to do so. 96 The main concern of states of first asylum is
generally the tremendous cost associated with large influxes. 97
The developed nations would also be willing to participate in
such a system. They are primarily concerned with preventing a mass
influx of"foreigners" which is seen as a threat to domestic harmony and
politically dangerous. 98 These nations would see the obligation to pay
the costs of maintaining refugees abroad as an acceptable trade-off. In
addition, developed nations already foot a large part of the bill for looking
after displaced persons through the UNHCR99: a direct obligation
would not make a big difference to them. Finally, the humanitarian and
human rights pressures that exist within developed states would exert
a certain amount of political pressure in favour of such a scheme.
Temporary dislocation, with a view to eventual repatriation,
would reduce the disruption in the lives of the refugees, themselves.
Instead of being transferred into a totally different environment, they
would remain in the same part of the world and expect to return to their
homes at some point. This factor would weaken as the length of the
refugee period increases but the sad fact is that many displaced persons
spend years in refugee camps as it is.100 Another destabilizing element
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for displaced persons is their precarious status in the state of first refuge.
Presumably, once international obligations were entered into, and
funding put into place, the level of security afforded would increase.
Instead of being dependent on the whims of a single, host state and the
'good offices' of the UNHCR, they would be protected by an international
agreement, possibly under a separate governing agency.
Finally, the cost of maintaining displaced persons in the state of
first refuge would be much less than that associated with permanent
relocation. Various plans for reducing costs, discussed above,101 could
be implemented. A uniform system for dealing with such people would
be administratively much more efficient and thereby cut costs. Most
importantly, the cost of maintenance in states of first refuge would tend
to be much less than in receiving states due to the nature of their
economies.
CONCLUSION
The Convention definition of a refugee is no longer viable. It was
originally designed to deal with the limited refugee situation that
existed forty years ago. Both the passage of time and the internationalization of refugee problems have weakened the effect of the definition to
the point where a majority of de facto refugees do not even come within
its ambit. Many of those who should be covered by the definition are not
afforded protection under the national schemes designed in accordance
with the Convention's provisions. The UNHCR tries to deal with refugee
situations as they arise but without guaranteed, long-term funding, the
response is woefully inadequate. It is clear that a new regime governing
refugees needs to be promulgated.
An international proposal for dealing with refugees must be
acceptable to state governments to gain acceptance. It should also take
into account current practices with regard to refugees. I suggest that a
proposal based on the idea of temporary refuge and envisaging eventual
voluntary repatriation would be most acceptable to all involved. In
practice, most refugees already remain in the country of first refuge.
Western states, through the UNHCR, already foot a large part of the bill
for these refugees and would be amenable to increased funding if they
could also renounce the obligation to accept large numbers ofrefugees as
citizens. A treaty, codifying a scheme along these lines, would regularize
current practices and provide enhanced protection for refugees.
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